The Yukos affair, a state-led assault on controlling shareholders of a private Russian oil company, demonstrated the shaky nature of property rights in emerging markets. As it appeared, the market was more effective in determining the underlying causes than business and political analysts. While some rating agencies first predicted no threat to company creditors, the stock market correctly predicted that (i) political ambitions of the Yukos CEO and other majority shareholders would prove damaging to their business; and (ii) arrests of Yukos' top managers for unrelated criminal charges was a signal of across-the-board toughening of the state policy towards big business. Among private companies, the risk appeared especially high for nontransparent companies, oil companies, and companies privatized via the infamous loans-forshares auctions. Surprisingly, transparent state-owned companies were also very sensitive to Yukos events. This evidence suggests that investors considered the risks of a company losing its value due to the political ambitions of its top management, but were also concerned with tax and privatization reviews for private companies and inefficient government interference for stateowned ones.
Introduction
When considering an investment into a firm, do investors need to pay attention to political ambitions of the CEO? Indeed, political risk is a salient feature of emerging markets. 1 Traditionally, scholars have focused on the impact of political events on financial performance and risk at the country level (e.g., Chan and Wei, 1996; Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1998 ; Kim and Mei, 2001; Azam, Bates, and Biais, 2005) . 2 Recently, a new literature has emerged that investigates the link between politics and finance at the company level by examining the value of political connections of individual companies (e.g., Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2005; Phillips-Patrick 1989; Bailey and Chung, 1995; Chen, Fan, and Wang, 2004; Cheung et al., 2005) . We contribute to the literature on the nature of companyspecific political risk with an analysis of the Yukos affair, a highly publicized story of state-led assault on a private Russian company owned by a small group of politically ambitious individuals.
While most of the Russian and world media, including leading rating agencies and business analysts, were focused on broad political consequences immediately after the attack, the market correctly interpreted the events as a starting point of an across-the-board increase in state involvement. Formally, the initial criminal charges brought against major shareholders and top managers of Yukos had nothing to do with the company. Standard & Poor's, a leading international rating agency, left Yukos' credit ratings (ВВ/Stable; ruAA+) unchanged in the days following its CEO's jailing. The agency's statement that circulated after Mikhail Khodorkovsky's arrest -four months after the arrest of the company's CFO Platon Lebedev -said: "The positive operational and financial indices of the company and its high liquidity protect creditors from the negative effects of these developments." Even after this second arrest, Alfa-bank, the largest private bank in Russia, asserted a positive outlook both for Yukos and the Russian stock market (Alfa-bank, November 2003 ). Yet, the market capitalization of Yukos decreased dramatically after its managers were arrested and various state agencies started to investigate the company and its employees. Moreover, stocks of other Russian companies also reacted negatively to Yukos events, and the degree of stock price reaction varied a lot across the companies. These company-1 Political risk usually includes risks of nationalization or expropriation, changes in currency and exchange controls, regulation and tax regimes; and general instability. 2 Other studies of political risk include Ekern (1971) ; Eaton and Turnovsky (1983) ; Alesina and Tabellini (1989) ; Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989); Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) ; Clark (1997) ; Mei and Guo (2002) ;
Vuchelen (2003); Amihud and Wohl (2004) ; and Durnev and Fauver (2007) .
specific market reactions allowed us to identify different types of enterprises vulnerable to political risk in Russia.
We investigate the nature of political risk faced by Russian firms via their stock market behavior in 2003, during the first months of the Yukos affair. How did investors interpret these events? The prevailing view (see a brief overview in Section 2) was that the attack on Yukos'
owners was meant to discourage their active involvement in politics and would not affect other companies (the "individual politics" hypothesis). However, we show that the market correctly reflected that the state agencies' actions against Yukos would have consequences for the whole business community.
Even with the understanding that the arrests of the two Yukos managers gave a signal of a dramatic change in the Kremlin's policy, investors might have had varying expectations of what would happen next. For example, the Yukos affair could be the first step in a campaign to strip oligarchs, big Russian businessmen, of their political influence (the "oligarch" hypothesis).
Alternatively, Yukos events could imply an increase in the probability of imposing a stricter tax regime for natural resource companies, especially those in the oil industry (the "oil rent" hypothesis). Or, the criminal investigation of Yukos managers might have indicated the government's intention to review the tax avoidance strategies actively used by Russian companies in 2000 (e.g., Desai, Dyck, and Zingales, 2004 and the privatization abuses of 1990s, probably opening the road for re-nationalization (the "tax review" and "privatization review" hypotheses, respectively). The common thread in these stories was the strengthening of the Kremlin's control over the business community and the possibility of selective government intervention, which could seriously damage any private company.
For state enterprises, the potential impact of Yukos events was less obvious. According to the "visible hand" hypothesis, the government would be more actively involved in their affairs and this interference could be beneficial or detrimental depending on the efficiency of the company's management.
At the early stages of the affair, when the tactics of the state had not yet been settled -until December 2003 it did not seem plausible that the main line of attack would be prosecution for tax avoidance in the past -various ministries and individual government officials were involved. Our data set includes 47 events defined as publications in which Yukos was mentioned along with one of the state agencies during a period from January 2003 to November 2003. The typical events in our data set are threats to revoke oil field licenses, anti-monopoly investigations, and personal charges for misdoings in past privatization deals or for tax evasion (see Appendix 1).
In the first part of the paper, we analyze how news involving Yukos along with different types of state agencies affected the company's stock price, using the market model as a benchmark. We find that Yukos' returns were mostly driven by employee-related charges by law enforcement agencies rather than charges against the company, which is consistent with the "individual politics" hypothesis. These results are robust and not driven by a few major events, such as the arrests of Yukos' top managers and shareholders.
Then, we examine which companies were more sensitive to the signals provided by state agencies' actions against Yukos. Using a sample of the 25 most liquid Russian common stocks, we run pooled cross-sectional regressions of stock returns during the event dates on the companyspecific political risk exposures, interacted with Yukos' returns. Among private companies, Yukos events involving law enforcement agencies had the strongest impact on non-transparent companies and those privatized via the infamous loans-for-shares auctions. In addition, Yukos events involving regulatory agencies had an oil-industry-wide impact. Apparently, investors foresaw that less transparent private companies were more likely to receive back-dated tax claims, whereas oil companies would have to pay more taxes in the future. The "oligarch" story is not supported by the data.
Surprisingly, transparent government-owned companies were also very sensitive to Yukos events. Probably, investors were afraid that these companies could be forced to join those state enterprises that provide massive non-tax benefits to the state bureaucracy (Gehlbach, 2003) .
Overall, this implies that the "individual politics" story cannot fully explain the state agencies' actions and that investors seriously considered the risks that the Kremlin's new policy implied for Russian companies.
Finally, we investigate in detail two other large Russian companies, Lukoil and Gazprom, to delineate the stock price reaction with respect to their own company-related news involving state agencies and to Yukos-related news. We find that stock returns of Lukoil, a private oil company, were affected both by its own negative events due to law enforcement agencies and by Yukos events due to other agencies. This could be due to the risks of oil rent, tax, and privatization review. In contrast, stock returns of Gazprom, a state-controlled gas monopolist, rose in response to the involvement of regulatory agencies that could discipline the company's management and to negative Yukos company-related events, which is consistent with investors foreseeing possible renationalization of Yukos' assets via state companies in the oil and gas sector.
Our work is directly related to the recent studies of political connections of big businessmen in Russia (Desai, Dyck, and Zingales, 2004; Frye, 2004; Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2004; Sonin, 2003, Durnev and Fauver, 2007) and elsewhere (e.g., Acemoglu, 2005; Desai and Moel, 2004; Hellman, 1998; Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 2000; Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2004; Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . The closest paper to ours is Fisman (2001) , which examines how political connections of Indonesian companies affected their stock market performance in 1995. He finds that Indonesian firms with close ties to the Suharto regime lost more value in response to news of Suharto's health problems than those less politically connected. Johnson and Mitton (2003) study an interaction between cronyism and capital controls in Malaysia at the time of the Asian crisis. They demonstrate that many firms with political connections lost valuable subsidies during the first phase of the crisis; however, some of them restored their subsidies after the government imposed capital controls in September 1998. Durnev and Fauver (2007) explore consequences of predatory policy by governments in emerging markets. Faccio (2005) examines the value of corporate connections with political officials using a comprehensive cross-country set of firms. She finds a significant increase in market capitalization when the company's directors or large shareholders enter politics, but not when politicians become involved in business. Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2005) document that politically connected companies are more likely to be bailed out than other firms. Chen et al. (2004) report that post-IPO underperformance of Chinese companies is largely attributable to the presence of politically connected CEOs. Using historical data from the German stock market, Ferguson and Voth (2005) find that firms with close links to the NSDAP reacted favorably to Hitler's seizure of power in 1933.
The specifics of our paper in relation to this literature is twofold. Firstly, we investigate in detail the negative side of political risk, i.e., the potential damage from the actions of state agencies for different types of companies. This damage may result not only from direct expropriation, but also from changes in taxation, regulation, etc. Secondly, we identify the key characteristics of the companies that make them vulnerable to the potential attack by the state.
This differs from the traditional approach, which examines whether the observed measure of company's political connections can explain its reaction to a certain event. In contrast, we do not have a good measure of the company's political risk exposure except for the government ownership (it is believed that every private company must be politically connected to stay afloat), but rather infer it from market reaction. Thus method may be applied out of the Russian context to identify the actual susceptibility to political risk of a given company in a period of instability, as perceived by the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we discuss the chronology of major Yukos events since its creation in 1993 and our empirical hypotheses.
Section 4 describes the data. In section 5, we employ time series analysis to investigate which type of Yukos events had the strongest impact on the company's stock price. In section 6, we use a pooled regression approach to examine factors that could explain the differences in other companies' stock price reaction to Yukos events. Section 7 presents a detailed time series analysis of the stock price behaviour of Lukoil and Gazprom in response to their own events and Yukos events involving state agencies. Section 8 concludes.
The Yukos Story
The story of Yukos has recently been reported in a number of policy texts (e.g., Aron, 2003; Hill, 2004) billion in property, plant, and equipment," refuting the argument that oligarchs were just stripping assets from the company (see also Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005) . Although the impressive growth of the company's value in 1998-2003 was partly due to historically high oil prices, it was faster than that of any other major oil company in the world. At the time of the assault, Yukos was the largest oil company in Russia and second only to Gazprom among all Russian companies, judging by market equity capitalization (see Table 1 ). A more relevant analogy can be drawn with the history of the Standard Oil break-up and other anti-trust investigations. (Bittlingmayer, 1992 analyses stock returns in anti-trust cases; Glaeser et al., 2003 draw parallels between large business conglomerates of the Gilded Age and modern Russian companies.) However, this analogy might be misleading as well. The primary concern of the U.S. government was restoring efficiency that was harmed by the monopoly position of the Standard Oil and similar companies. In contrast, although it was indeed a giant company, Yukos still faced stiff competition both at home, where the remaining four largest oil companies are almost as big, and abroad, where it had to compete with multinational majors such as Royal Dutch/Shell, Chevron, BP, etc. On the political side, some similarity stems from the fact that both the prosecution of Standard Oil and the attack on Yukos were directed by popular politicians and enjoyed significant support of the public at large. As the affair escalated, investors started to consider the state agencies' actions against
Yukos as a signal of changes in the Kremlin's economic policy towards the business community.
Several stories circulated in the market at that time, ranging from a personal feud between President Putin and Yukos' CEO Khodorkovsky, a battle between the evil of dictatorship and the angel of democracy and a clash between the supporters of a stronger role for the state and advocates of the free market economy, to an institutional response to the subversion of institutions by the rich during the first decade of reforms (Glaeser, Sheinkman, and Shleifer, 2003) . Each story would predict a specific market reaction to Yukos events (see Table 2 ).
The political story suggests that the attack on Yukos' key figures, who had allegedly been financing both left-wing and right-wing parties on a regular basis, could be a part of President Putin's strategy to eliminate any substantial political opposition to his rule, which was especially important before the upcoming elections to the Duma, the lower house of Russia's parliament. With the "individual politics" hypothesis rejected by the data, a question arises about the government motives underlying the Yukos affair. One explanation of the Yukos events rests on the Kremlin's intention to curb the influence of the "oligarchs," a group of very wealthy and politically influential businessmen. Starting from the financing of Yeltsin's re-election campaign in 1996, the oligarchs virtually "privatized the state," as many senior officials and legislators were effectively on the payroll of one or another of the leading business groups (e.g., Frye, 2004; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2004) . The attack on Yukos' owners could be just the first step in a new campaign against the business empires built by oligarchs during Yeltsin era: "the crackdown on
This explanation of the
Mikhail Khodorkovsky has many causes, not least Kremlin intrigue and public anger at the wealth of the oligarchs" (Financial Times, July 31, 2003) . The "oligarch" hypothesis predicts that companies belonging to these empires were set to lose value in response to negative Yukos events.
Another broad explanation of Yukos events highlights the Putin administration's plans to extract more oil rents in a period of rising oil prices. The attack on the owners of Yukos, the largest oil producer, reduced their political and economic influence and increased the probability of oil export tariffs being raised. (The pro-Putin Unity party actively used the oil rent slogan in its election campaign and indeed raised the marginal oil export tariff to 90% after gaining the majority of Duma seats in December 2003.) The "oil rent" hypothesis suggests that oil companies would react negatively to the actions of state agencies against Yukos. In this case, the arrests have to be interpreted as warning signals to other oil majors who lobbied for low tariffs. An alternative "competition" hypothesis predicts that oil companies would profit from the weakening of their competitor and react positively to negative developments with Yukos.
There was also a tax-related story stating that Yukos was investigated (and ultimately charged) for the tax minimization policies it used in the past. Largely inefficient and vague tax legislation left numerous loopholes that were used by many companies. (Dyck, Desai, and Zingales, 2005 , provide a detailed analysis of tax minimization schemes used by Sibneft, one of major Russian oil companies.) The "tax review" ("tax skeletons") hypothesis predicts that companies actively using tax minimization schemes in the past, which were typically nontransparent, would be more likely to become a target for the government's investigations.
5
Yet another explanation is that the new political elite brought to the government by the dramatic rise of President Putin was eager to revisit the shady privatization of the 1990s and reestablish state control over the "crown jewels" of Russian industry. The most notorious privatization happened in 1996, before the presidential elections in which Gennady Zyuganov, a leader of the communist party, had a strong chance of ousting the incumbent president Boris
Yeltsin. At a time of looming economic crisis, President Yeltsin badly needed additional budget revenues and political support from Russian business before the elections. Probably, this motivated the government's decision to attract loans from several Russian private banks, using large state-owned equity stakes in leading Russian natural resources companies as collateral.
Then, companies that were granted the right to provide loans organized the loans-for-shares auctions; in all cases, a company affiliated with the organizer won an auction at a low price (Freeland, 2002) . Since the loans were not to be repaid, the auctions' winners soon became the major shareholders of the former state enterprises. Among them were Yukos and five other companies including NorilskNickel and Surgutneftegaz (see Table 1 ). According to the "privatization review" hypothesis, companies privatized via shady schemes such as loans-forshares auctions would be sensitive to Yukos events.
The hypotheses formulated above indicate a strengthening of the Kremlin's control over the Russian business community, which could have different implications for the stock prices of
Yukos and other private companies. The impact of the new government policy on state-owned companies could be twofold. On the one hand, more attention from its major owner can be beneficial for a company, clarifying the often murky policies used by the incumbent managers and increasing its efficiency and stock price. On the other hand, the interference of government officials could damage those state enterprises that had already been efficiently managed and force them to join the ones that provided massive non-tax benefits to the state bureaucracy (Gehlbach, 2003) . Thus, the "visible hand" hypothesis predicts a positive impact of Yukos events on the stock prices of the inefficient state-owned companies and a negative impact on efficiently managed state-owned companies.
Description of the data
The events analyzed in our study were selected by searching the archives of RBC News, as well as Kommersant and The last two groups intersect, as there are 7 negative company-related events involving both types of agencies. There are no employee-related events initiated by non-law-enforcement agencies. 9 We used daily close prices at the MICEX ("Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange") for most of the stocks.
For four stocks (MTS, VimpelCom, Golden Telecom, and Wimm-Bill-Dann) that were primarily traded on the NYSE, we used the corresponding ADR close prices. likely to be higher in case of an efficient management. Third, the oil industry dummy distinguishes the group of oil companies, which are most susceptible to the change in the "oil rent" taxation policy. Fourth, the fraction of shares sold at loans-for-shares auctions reflects the vulnerability of private companies with respect to the risk of privatization review. Finally, we use the oligarch dummy for companies classified in Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) as those controlled by the oligarchs. Several other variables including industry dummies, a dummy equal to 1 for stocks with ADRs traded at NYSE, and the log of the company's market equity capitalization were used as controls.
Our final sample includes 25 common stocks of large Russian companies that were actively traded during the sample period and had T&D scores. Table 1 presents their descriptive statistics.
Even though the five largest companies come from the oil and gas sector, other industries such utilities (6 companies), telecoms (5 companies), machinery, and metallurgy (both with 2 companies) are also well represented. The government-owned companies are concentrated in utilities and telecoms; besides those, the federal government effectively controls the gas monopolist Gazprom with a 38% stake and the largest retail bank Sberbank with a 64% stake.
The T&D scores range from 0.14 for Avtovaz, which is a private auto-making company, and 0.17
for Rostovenergo, a state-owned utility company, to 0.77 for the leading private mobile operator MTS. On average, the T&D scores are higher for private companies than for the governmentowned ones (0.4 and 0.3, respectively). , and by 14% in October 27, 2003, respectively. Interestingly, the first arrest had almost no effect on other stocks. Based on our conversations with the financial analysts, the prevailing opinion at the time was that the action would not have drastic consequences even for Yukos (and even less for other companies) and would finish soon. However, the second arrest was perceived by many as having crossed a borderline indicating a serious change in the government's policy towards Yukos and, in general, towards the whole business community in Russia. As a result, the market index fell by 9.6%, whereas the firm-specific reaction varied from a more than 10% stock price decline for Sibneft, Rostelecom, Avtovaz, and Sverdlovenergo to a slightly positive change for MTS, Wimm-Bill-Dann, and Golden Telecom (see the last column in Table 1 ).
and 32% for Lukoil). The seeming inconsistency between the two tax measures is apparently due to the difference in costs and, most importantly, in the degree of use of regional (so-called "internal offshore") tax-incentive schemes. Yukos and to the market index, demonstrating that Yukos events had an overall market impact.
The reaction of other companies to Yukos events is further analyzed in section 5.
We conduct a preliminary analysis of the impact of government-related news on Yukos' returns using a control portfolio, which is a value-weighted portfolio of four other large Russian oil companies: Lukoil, Sibneft, Tatneft, and Surgutneftegaz (see Table 1 ). 12 During the sample period, the control portfolio had an average daily return of 0.14% p.a., which rose to 1.71% and fell to -0.9% during the days with positive and negative Yukos-related events, respectively (see Table 3 ). However, these swings were less pronounced than those for Yukos, as its average abnormal return (defined as the difference between Yukos' return and control portfolio's return;
see, e.g., Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997), was close to zero during the whole sample period, increased to 1.01% in response to positive news and decreased to -1.06% after negative news. Yukos' stock price sensitivity to political news was the highest with respect to the employee-related news initiated by law enforcement agencies (an abnormal return of -1.07%), which again demonstrates the political nature of risk faced by the company, incorporated by investors in its stock price. A more elaborate analysis of Yukos' stock price behavior is in the next section.
The reaction of Yukos' stock price to the actions of state agencies
In the current section, we investigate the reaction of Yukos' stock price to the actions of state agencies, using time series analysis and employing the market model as a benchmark. The basic model is as follows: where R Y,t and R M,t are returns of Yukos and the market index 13 on day t; Pos and Neg are dummy variables equal to 1 in the case of positive and negative events, respectively; ε t is the error term.
As was demonstrated in the previous section, Yukos events had a market-wide impact, influencing not only Yukos' own return, but also returns of other Russian stocks. This model allows us to measure the impact of different types of Yukos-related news on company's returns, controlling for the market risk. 14 In all subsequent regressions, we compute Newey-West heteroscedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors.
The estimation results (see column 3 of Table 4 ) reinforce the conclusions made in the previous section. Both negative and positive events are associated with highly significant daily abnormal returns in the order of -1.35% and 1.12%, respectively.
To check the robustness of our findings to the presence of major events such as top managers' arrests, we add to regression (1) a dummy variable Arrest equal to one for the trading days when the market received news about the arrests of Yukos' top managers and shareholders, Platon Lebedev and Mikhail Khodorkovsky (July 3 and October 27, 2003) . The estimation results demonstrate that our general findings are robust and not driven by a few major events, such as the arrests of Yukos' top managers. Other negative events led to an average daily abnormal return of -1.1%, while arrests produced a further 5.5% decline in price (see column 4 in Table 4 ).
To study the specifics of market reaction to different types of news, we define two 
For these three types of events, only the negative employee-related news initiated by law enforcement agencies have a significant effect, driving down the level of Yukos' returns by 1.1% 13 We use a self-constructed capitalization-weighted index of 57 most liquid Russian stocks excluding Yukos as the market index. Using a standard market index such as S&P/RUX or RTSI including Yukos could potentially lead to erroneous correlation between the changes in stock price of Yukos and its market beta. However, all our results remain the same irrespectively of the market index used.
14 In the earlier version of the paper, we allowed the market beta to vary depending on different types of Yukos events. This had no material effect on the impact of news on abnormal returns.
(see the last column in Table 4 ). The fact that company-related charges have no significant impact on Yukos' stock price might seem puzzling at the first sight. Apparently, investors interpret personal charges, even though formally unrelated to Yukos, as a signal about the future of the company. This evidence is consistent with the "politics" hypothesis, according to which the actions of state agencies against Yukos' shareholders, driven by political motives, could ultimately lead to the expropriation of the company. Another possible explanation for the decline in Yukos' price in response to the charges against its top managers could be the loss in their specific managerial skills that could be very valuable for the company. However, this is inconsistent with a very positive market reaction to the news about the resignation of Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky on November 3, 2003, which led to 13% rise in Yukos' stock price and 6% growth of the market index.
The reaction of other companies' stock prices to Yukos events
In this section, we investigate whether there are systematic differences in the firm-specific stock price reactions to Yukos events related to companies' exposures to political risk. We run pooled cross-sectional regressions of stock returns during the event days on proxies for the company's political risk exposure, as well as Yukos' returns interacted with the proxies:
where R i,t is company i's return on event day t, 15 ε i,t is the error term, and RISK = (const, Gvt, TD, Gvt*TD, Oil, LS, Olig) is the vector of company-specific political risk exposures. Here, Gvt i
and TD i denote the government's common stock ownership and T&D score of company i, Oil
and Olig are the oil industry and oligarch dummies, respectively, and LS is the fraction of company's shares sold at the loans-for-shares auctions. As we will see, the impact of the T&D score is opposite for private and government-owned companies; this difference is captured by the coefficient on the interaction effect between Gvt and TD.
In this model, we allow the coefficients on political risk exposures to differ across the events; in particular, companies' stock returns may be more sensitive to events characterized by higher Yukos' return, R Y,t . 16 The regression is estimated for different subsets of events: positive, negative, negative employee-related, negative company-related due to law enforcement agencies, negative company-related due to non-law-enforcement agencies, and finally major negative (with Yukos' return below -2%; there were 17 events of this type).
15 If the company's stock was not traded in a given day, the observation was excluded from the regression. 16 This approach is similar to that by Fisman (2001) , who examined the effect of the political variables interacted with return on the market index on individual stock returns in Indonesia. We obtain similar results when we use the market return instead of Yukos' return as a measure of the importance of an event. This evidence is consistent with the "visible hand" and "tax review" hypotheses. It seems that investors consider the more interventionist policy of the government as a risk factor for efficiently managed state enterprises and less transparent private companies. It should be noted that this effect is mostly driven by market reaction to negative employee-related events involving law enforcement agencies (see column 5 of table 5). The fact that personal charges formally unrelated to the company have such a strong impact not only on Yukos' but also on other companies' stock prices is puzzling and provides a hint to the political nature of the whole affair.
On top of these effects, companies with a large stake sold via loans-for-shares auctions (e.g., around 40% for Surgutneftegaz) suffer an additional 0.34% decline in price in response to a 1% fall in Yukos' stock price. As a result, these companies are among the most sensitive to worst Yukos events; for example, the model predicts Surgutneftegaz' stock price to drop by 2.7% after a -5% shock in Yukos' return. This is in line with the "privatization review" hypothesis. This effect is pronounced for both employee-and company-related negative events initiated by law enforcement agencies (columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 ).
Company-related negative events initiated by non-law-enforcement agencies affect oil companies, whose stock prices decline by an additional 0.28% in response to a 1% fall in Yukos' stock price. This clearly supports the "oil rent" hypothesis (column 7 of Table 5 ).
We performed a number of robustness checks. In particular, we estimated model (4) using a subset of major negative Yukos events (with returns below -2%; see the last column of Table 5 ), using a longer sample period including the year 2002, and controlling for fixed time effects. This did not materially change our results. We also estimated the model (4) with additional control variables. Such variables as other industry dummies, the ADR dummy equal to 1 for stocks with ADRs traded at NYSE, and the company's size measured as the log of the market value of its equity turned out mostly insignificant and had no effect on our main results.
The reaction of Lukoil and Gazprom stock prices to their own and Yukos events
In this section, we conduct time series analysis of the political risk of two other major Russian companies, Gazprom and Lukoil, which had, respectively, the largest and third-largest market equity capitalization at the end of 2002 (see Table 1 ). This approach helps us to refine the analysis of how the most important Russian stocks reacted to Yukos events, since we can now explicitly control for the impact of their own events involving the government. This is important, since strong results demonstrated in the previous section could due to the state agencies undertaking similar actions against Yukos and other Russian companies.
After the prosecution of Yukos, Lukoil became the largest oil producer in Russia. It is a private company, although the government had held a minor (7.6%) stake until September 29, 2004 , when this stake was sold to ConocoPhillips. As discussed in section 2, Lukoil could be negatively affected by Yukos events along the lines of the "tax review," "oil rent," and "privatization review" hypotheses. At the same time, it could profit from the weakening of its major competitor in accordance with the "competition" hypothesis.
Gazprom holds a virtual monopoly in the Russian gas market. At the time of the affair, the state owned a major (38%) stake in Gazprom, which allowed the government effectively to control the company. As a result, Gazprom frequently provides support for government policy at home (by keeping gas tariffs low) and abroad (by selling gas at low prices to friendly neighbouring countries), even though that comes at the expense of minority shareholders. The company is often criticized for the lack of transparency and relatively inefficient management.
The Economist (June 20, 2005) elaborated on Gazprom: "The gas giant has been likened more to a state ministry than a profit-motivated corporation" and pointed to "wasteful tax-payment schemes, seeming nonchalance about unpaid bills, disproportionately high wage costs and suspiciously costly pipeline projects." According to the "visible hand" hypothesis, the impact of more interventionist government policy on Gazprom could be either positive or negative, depending on the quality of the current company's management relative to that of the bureaucrats. In addition, Gazprom could exploit its closeness to the state to profit from a potential
Yukos break-up.
We gathered sets of positive and negative events for Gazprom and Lukoil using the same procedure as for Yukos. Since there were only a few company-related events in 2003, the analysis in this section is based on a sample period, which was extended to include year 2002 (January 1, 2002 , to November 27, 2003 . Our data set comprises 26 events (including 6 positive) for
Gazprom and 35 events (11 positive) for Lukoil. The extended set of Yukos events includes 11 positive and 42 negative events.
We study the political risk of the two companies along two lines. First of all, we partly replicate the preceding time series analysis for Yukos (models (1) and (2)), looking at the impact of company (Lukoil or Gazprom) events on respective stock returns. Since there were practically no employee-related events for these companies, we only make a distinction between events initiated by law enforcement agencies and those involving other state agencies in model (2).
Secondly, we investigate whether Yukos events had an impact on the stock market performance of Lukoil and Gazprom, controlling for the effect of their own news. The following two regressions include dummies both for Lukoil (or Gazprom) events and Yukos events. In the regression R i,t = α 0 + α 1 Pos t + α 2 Neg t + α 7 PosY t + α 8 NegY t + β R M,t + ε t ,
R i,t is return of Lukoil or Gazprom on day t, R M,t is the return on S&P/RUX market index on day t, the event dummies are defined as before, and 'Y' denotes variables referring to Yukos. Here, the coefficients α 1 and α 2 measure the company's reaction to its own news, whereas α 7 and α 8 represent the impact of Yukos events.
We extend this model separating the impact of different types of negative events: (5) where the event dummies are defined along similar lines as above.
Tables 6 and 7 present results of the regression analysis for Lukoil and Gazprom, respectively. For Lukoil, negative company-related events implied a significant daily abnormal return of -0.5%, which, similarly to Yukos, was mostly due to the effect of news involving law enforcement agencies. It seems that the market seriously considered the possibility of yet another case against a private oil company. Separating the impact of different types of Yukos events, we observe that Yukos news involving non-law-enforcement agencies negatively affected Lukoil's returns, driving them down by 1.02% on average (the last column in Table 6 ). The sensitivity of
Lukoil to the actions of such agencies as the Ministry of Natural Resources against Yukos is consistent with the "oil rent" hypothesis and results in the previous section. Indeed, Lukoil is quite transparent and has a relatively clean privatization history (a minor 5% stake was sold via loans-for-shares auction); therefore, it is less prone to the tax and privatization review risks.
The nature of political risk for Gazprom is very different. On the one hand, positive news events involving state agencies had a marginally significant positive impact on Gazprom, driving its stock price up by 1.4% on average. On the other hand, negative news involving non-lawenforcement state agencies also led to positive abnormal daily returns in the order of 0.7%, which are very significant. This is in line with the "visible hand" hypothesis, according to which the inefficient management of Gazprom is disciplined when the respective authorities such as
Ministry of Natural Resources, Ministry of Anti-Monopoly Policy, and State Auditing Chamber turn their attention to the company. Negative Yukos company-related events due to law enforcement agencies imply a marginally significant increase in Gazprom's stock price by 0.65%. This may be explained by the "visible hand" hypothesis or by the view that Gazprom could profit from the break-up of Yukos.
Conclusion
The Yukos affair provides an excellent opportunity to investigate the nature of the political risk. In 2003, during the early stage of the Yukos affair, the state agencies' actions had a negative impact not only on Yukos' but also on other Russian companies' stock prices. Apparently, investors interpreted Yukos events not only as a politically motivated attack on the company's owners, but also as a signal about the change in the government policy towards the whole business community. Stock prices of those private companies that belonged to the oil industry, were non-transparent, and/or privatized via loans-for-shares auctions were most sensitive to
Yukos events. This indicates that investors seriously considered the risk of expropriation of these companies through the use of such political instruments as selective tax enforcement. 17 However, the market did not interpret the Yukos affair as the beginning of a campaign against oligarchs. In accordance with the "visible hand" hypothesis, the more interventionist government policy was well-perceived for non-transparent state-owned companies, such as Gazprom, and had Since the beginning of the Yukos affair, several private and state-controlled companies received large back-dated tax offences. 18 The most notorious one was against Vimpelcom, a transparent private mobile operator, 19 which caused a plunge in the company's stock price by 23% and in the market index by 6%. On the good side, budget revenues have increased substantially. First, many large companies abandoned "gray" tax minimization schemes used in the past, which led to an increase in their effective tax rates. Second, after the pro-Putin Unity party won an absolute majority of seats in December 2003 parliament elections, the Duma dramatically raised the export tariff on oil, making the marginal rate close to 90%. On the bad side, the fear of expropriation led to the recommencement of capital flight and a slowdown in economic growth, despite ever-rising oil prices, which is consistent with cross-country evidence by Bohn and Deacon (2000) and Lensink, Hermes, and Murinde (2000) . We observed creeping 
